A specter, one might say, is haunting China.
China an anticipatory promise similar to that which Marx and Engels had previously found in communism.
At the same time, however, this "return" of capitalism to con temporary China is itself haunted by the nation's own enduring socialist legacy. Unlike the Soviet Union and other Eastern Eu ro pean states, whose communist regimes collapsed in rapid succession in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the communist government that Mao Zedong established in China in 1949 was never technically dissolved. Instead, under Deng Xiaoping, China developed a hybrid po liti cal economy wherein an embrace of free-market princi ples was qualified by a retention of many ele ments inherited from its socialist po liti cal structure and social organ ization. For instance, the country continues to lack open elections, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or even a fully convertible currency-as a support of capitalism is strategically counterbalanced by a comparatively tight control over many socioeconomic factors (Kirby 2011) .
Many socialist-era institutional structures persist in the modern period, though their significance is often greatly transformed. For instance, the house hold registration, or hukou, system was implemented in the 1950s under Mao, and it was initially designed to limit the movement of citizens between diff er ent communities and regions in China-and particularly from the countryside into urban areas. Many essential social ser vices were only available to residents of the communities to which they were assigned, and consequently people had very little opportunity to relocate at will. Although the hukou system has remained basically intact in the post-Mao era, it is now significantly weakened, and for many rural Chinese the lure of increased earning potential in China's cities outweighs the risk of losing access to the social ser vices accorded them by their hukou. As a result, more than a hundred million rural residents are currently living and working away from what were formerly their official home locations. At the same time, however, while the hukou system no longer prevents internal migration, its vestigial presence does continue to carry significant social consequences, because it relegates China's mi grant workers to the status of partially disenfranchised second-class citizens (Young 2013) .
This interweaving of earlier socialist structures with newer cap i tal ist ones may be seen as an institutional version of a phenomenon that the historian Geremie Barmé (1996) has memorably called "shades of Mao. " Barmé describes how, in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a veritable explosion of Maoist images and icons in China, as Mao Zedong-who, during his reign as the titular head of the People's Republic, had encouraged a cult of personality centered around himself while at the same time attempting to abolish both or ga nized and folk religious practice-ironically became transformed into a virtual deity in his own right, and Maoist icons were treated as sacred relics. The con temporary fascination with these icons, therefore, marks an uncanny return of the Great Helmsman's legendary cult of personality, while also embodying the same religious iconography and commodity fetishism that Mao had originally tried to abolish. By a similar token, the market capitalism that emerged in China following Mao's death is closely intertwined with his legacy, as the social institutions he helped put in place have become potent symbols of both China's socialist past as well as its cap i tal ist pres ent.
Fi nally, the partial displacement of communism by the forces of global capital has helped bring into sharper relief the Marxian critique of capitalism that had inspired China's communist system in the first place. That is to say, China's rapid economic growth in the post-Mao period has not only brought hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, but also generated yawning disparities of wealth and earning potential. The resulting witch's brew of stateowned enterprises, joint-venture companies, wealthy investors, middle-class consumers, and a vast floating population of mi grant labor has yielded a highly fluid relationship between capital and labor that virtually demands a critical Marxian analy sis.
In his influential study Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida argues that, in the wake of the collapse of most of the world's communist states, the spirit of Marx's original critique remains more relevant than ever. He contends that the spread of neoliberalism has contributed to an epidemic of "vio lence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression" around the world, and suggests that Marxian theory offers a productive response to these problems (Derrida 1994: 106) . In par tic u lar, Derrida contrasts the way foreign debt is mobilized to support the legitimacy of a neoliberal regime, on one hand, and the way a logic of intellectual indebtedness to the critical tradition associated with Marxism necessarily underlies any con temporary attempt to reappropriate a legacy of Marxian critique, on the other.
In this volume, we argue that in con temporary China the structural tensions produced by overlapping socialist and cap i tal ist regimes have the potential to open up a set of new emancipatory possibilities. In short, we argue that pres ent-day China is shadowed by three mutually imbricated sets of spectral apparitions: (1) a cap i tal ist order that promises to reverse the consequences of China's quarter century of Maoist rule; (2) the institutional legacy of this Maoist regime, which continues to shape con temporary Chinese society in critical ways; and (3) a spirit of re sis tance and critique consonant with the under lying princi ples of Marxist theory. Con temporary China, in other words, is haunted by what we might call the ghosts of capital, shades of Mao, and specters of Marx.
Some of the implications of this tripartite haunting become more apparent if we return to Derrida's Specters of Marx. Despite having been written at a time when the People's Republic of China was one of the world's few remaining communist states, Derrida's study makes virtually no mention of China, though the work does carry traces of China's latent presence in the form of three allusions embedded in the margins of the text, each of which is associated with a diff er ent valence of con temporary China's post-Maoist condition.
To begin with, China is mentioned only once in Specters of Marx, and this reference is not even in Derrida's own voice. Instead, it appears in Derrida's discussion of the famous analy sis of commodity fetishism in Capital, in which Marx posits that material commodities come to assume a mystical character that occludes the human labor and social relations responsible for their production. Marx cites as an example a wooden table, noting that as a commodity it comes to assume anthropomorphic qualities "far more wonderful than ' table-turning' ever was, " and in a corresponding footnote he observes that "one may recall that China and the tables began to dance when the rest of the world appeared to be standing still" (Marx 1977: 163; cited in Derrida 1994: 153) . Here, Marx is evidently alluding both to the fascination with spiritualism (and specifically " table-turning") that developed among the Eu ro pean aristocracy following the failure of the continent's revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849, as well as to China's Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), which nearly toppled the Qing dynasty during the same midcentury period. Given that the Taiping Rebellion embraced such progressive goals as gender equality, the abolition of private property, and the equal distribution of land, the rebellion may be seen as a reflection of the objectives outlined in The Communist Manifesto itself, and therefore Marx's image of midcentury China "dancing" while "the rest of the world appeared to be standing still" positions the Central Kingdom as a spectral obverse of Eu ro pean society-or what Marx ironically calls here "the rest of the world. "
As with China, the word Chinese is also mentioned only once in Derrida's text, and this reference is not in Derrida's own voice either. Rather, it appears in his citation of Alexander Kojève's postscript to the second edition of his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in which Kojève proposes that "if Americans appear to be Sino-Soviets who have gotten rich, it is because the Rus sians and the Chinese are still but impover-ished Americans, moreover on a rapid road to wealth" (Kojève 1962: 436-437; cited in Derrida 1994: 72) . Writing in 1962, Kojève, in this eerily prescient passage, sees the Soviet Union's and Maoist China's emphases on poverty and the re distribution of wealth as an uncanny anticipation of the "rapid road to wealth" on which he believes both nations will soon embark. He suggests, in other words, that communism contains buried within itself a cap i tal ist imperative against which it is nominally opposed.
A third allusion to China may be found not in Derrida's text proper, but rather in the work's historical margins. When Derrida first published Specters of Marx in 1993, many of Asia's economies had been enjoying several years of impressively robust economic growth, though only four years later a chain reaction of currency collapses in several Asian countries temporarily brought this growth to a virtual standstill. While the precise causes of this regional crisis are complex and multifold, one impor tant factor was a collective anxiety surrounding the impending return of Hong Kong to Chinese control. The Hong Kong Retrocession was perceived as having crucial implications not only for Hong Kong but also for the region as a whole, insofar as much of the region's foreign investment was channeled through Hong Kong financial institutions. It is telling, therefore, that the first widely recognized symptom of the Asian financial crisis-the abrupt devaluation of the Thai baht as a result of aggressive selling on the international currency markets-occurred on July 2, 1997, just one day after the July 1 return of Hong Kong to China. In the following weeks, several other Asian countries similarly suffered runs on their currencies, as the entire region quickly found itself mired in an acute recession. China, however, remained largely unaffected-in part because its currency was not fully convertible and, hence, was shielded from the international currency market. To the extent that the Asian miracle may be seen as an expression of a cap i tal ist logic, China's role in helping to provide the catalyst for the resulting crisis-together with the nation's own subsequent immunity from the most serious consequences of the crisis itself-illustrates the role that the nation's vestigial communist institutions and policies continue to play in the nominally postsocialist world.
One of the international community's primary responses to the Asian financial crisis, meanwhile, was to arrange for the International Monetary Fund (imf) to grant large bailout packages to help stabilize the currencies of the countries most severely affected by the crisis. The imf, following a practice initially developed in the 1950s, made the loans contingent on the countries' agreements to reform their macroeconomic and monetary policies in accordance with imf demands. This practice of "conditionality, " however, has been criticized for being insufficiently attuned to the specific needs of each individual country or region. The imf has been accused, in other words, of serving as a vehicle for the export of a tacitly imperialistic model of Western capitalism, and the Asian financial crisis dramatizes the tension between the global spread of capitalism and economic growth, on one hand, and Western-centered financial institutions' attempts to circumscribe this proliferation of cap i tal ist models, on the other.
Just as Derrida's seminal study Of Grammatology characterizes the Chinese script as "a sort of Eu ro pean hallucination" for Enlightenment-era thinkers attempting to critique the perceived limits of Eu ro pean writing systems (Derrida 1998: 80) , in Specters of Marx China itself functions as a hallucinatory mirror image of Western capitalism. In each of the three preceding allusions ensconced in the margins of Derrida's text, China-either in its precommunist, high communist, or "postcommunist" incarnations-is viewed as not only an antithesis of capitalism but also an ironic embodiment of capitalism's own under lying logic. In par tic u lar, and to use the conceptual shorthand introduced above, Marx's "dancing China" allusion to the Taiping Rebellion articulates a desire for an alternate expression of Marx's own communist ideals-which is to say, the rebellion functions as an ironic anticipation of what Derrida calls the specters of Marx. Kojève's "road to wealth" discussion of the People's Republic, meanwhile, describes how even Maoist China was haunted by a suppressed desire for wealth, or what we might call the ghosts of capital. Fi nally, con temporary China's partial complicity in-and its subsequent immunity from-the 1997 Asian financial crisis may be seen as an illustration of the institutional legacy of communism, or what we are calling here the shades of Mao.
To the extent that Derrida's Specters of Marx argues that the con temporary neoliberal order has produced a set of socioeconomic relations that invite a Marxian critique, the preceding reading of the virtual absence of China from Derrida's own text suggests instead that the nation's peculiar historical trajectory in the post-Mao era may offer an alternate entry point into an assessment of the relationship between capitalism and communism. Here, accordingly, we are interested in the way con temporary China illustrates some of the concerns that haunt the margins of Derrida's text.
In this volume, we take as our starting point China's rapid transformation from an impoverished communist state into the world's largest economy, and we approach economic development as the result not of a set of ineluctable historical imperatives (as imagined within Marxism) or deliberate economic strategies (as imagined within capitalism), but rather as discrete practices and procedures, or what we call here "protocols. " The product of overlapping institutional strategies, po liti cal procedures, legal regulations, religious rituals, and everyday practices, these protocols are significant for their real-world implications as well as for the ways they may help shape a public imaginary. They not only have a potentially normalizing function, helping interpellate subjects into a national po liti cal economy, but they may also encourage a pattern of disruptive, counterhegemonic tendencies that may in turn help generate new subject positions that potentially stand at cross-purposes with the nominal objectives of the national po liti cal economy. We are particularly interested in the way these protocols may help constitute national subjects and the nation itself, while at the same time they may also create a space wherein this same national imaginary may be interrogated. Drawing from methodologies associated with both the humanities and the interpretive social sciences, we seek to situate con temporary China's dialectic of development and displacement at the juncture of society and ideology-between the world as experienced and the world as imagined.
When Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's de facto leader following Mao Zedong's death in 1976, he found himself at the helm of a nation that was predominantly poor and rural, and was comparatively isolated from the West. Deng's Reform and Opening Up campaign in 1978 was designed to help jump-start the country's economy, and it succeeded in a spectacular fashion. Over the following three and a half de cades, China's gdp increased more than a hundredfold, and in 2014 the nation passed the United States to become the world's largest economy. During the same period, China's foreign exchange reserves increased by a factor of more than two thousand, from $1.6 billion to more than $3.2 trillion, giving it the largest store of foreign exchange reserves in the world (and more than its four closest rivals-Japan, the Eu ro pean Union, Saudi Arabia, and Russia-combined). 1 The result is a peculiar hybrid-a cap i tal ist juggernaut retaining ele ments of a socialist planned economy-that has proven particularly adept at weathering the global financial crises that have rocked many of the world's other economies.
Our goal, however, is not to celebrate con temporary China's rapid growth, but rather to critically examine its structural contradictions. While China's economy has grown rapidly since the early 1980s, this new wealth has been very unevenly distributed. Indeed, at the beginning of the Reform Era, Deng Xiaoping famously declared that a minority of the population should be allowed to "get rich first, " and sure enough the nation's Gini coefficient-a standard mea sure of income in equality-has subsequently ballooned from an impressively low 0.16 to a dangerously high 0.47. The result is a nation marked by a set of profound contradictions. China has one of the world's largest and fastest-growing markets for high-end luxury products, but it also has one of the world's largest pools of cheap labor. It has many of the world's largest and fastest-growing metropolises, yet as many as a third of the residents of its largest cities are mi grant laborers with little legal standing. It has one of the world's largest and fastest-growing telecommunications industries, yet it is notorious for its attempts to exercise po liti cal control over public and private expression. Con temporary China, in short, represents a hyperbolic expression of both global capitalism and its putative communist antithesis, and it is within the interstices between these two nominally antithetical political-economic regimes that one finds an array of new structural possibilities.
To explore these tensions, we offer a series of case studies examining the relationship between con temporary China's economic development and its ramifications-particularly the relationship between capital and labor, governmentality and biopolitics, regionalism and globalism. Through the lens of vari ous social and cultural phenomena, we consider some of the ways China's growth has been perceived and experienced by those most immediately affected by it, arguing that an attention to these perceptual realities offers the possibility of a more nuanced understanding of the po liti cal and economic protocols that help shape this growth.
This volume is divided into three parts, focusing on interrelated themes of urbanization, transformation, and migration. In part I, we begin by examining the figure of the city, as both a material place and an imaginary entity. According to official census figures, between 1982 and 2010 the percentage of China's population living in urban areas expanded from 20.6 percent to 49.7 percent. Given that the nation's overall population grew by more than a third of a billion during the same period, the total increase in urban residents was more than 450 million people. The result has been a rapid increase in the size and number of the nation's urban centers, to the point that China currently has more than 120 cities with populations of greater than a million, including several in excess of 10 million. One consequence of China's rapid urbanization, however, is that many of its cities now find themselves wedged between memories of their past and anticipatory visions of the metropolises that they are on the verge of becoming. The significance of the city, accordingly, lies in its status as not merely a material entity and a lived space, but also as a symbolic space conditioned both by a collective recollection of the past and an anticipation of the future.
The three chapters in part I-by Yomi Braester, Robin Visser, and Alexander Des Forges-examine pro cesses of urbanization in con temporary China. Focusing on themes of urban construction, the construction of "new cities" at the geographic peripheries of existing metropolises, and the relationship between cities and their residents, these three authors reflect on some of the implications of the rapid growth and transformation of urban regions in contemporary China. They argue that cities are frequently viewed through the lens of a future that they have not yet become and that this future-oriented perspective has complex-and often quite problematic-implications for the politics of urbanization discourses and their corresponding practices.
Next, we turn our attention to the ways in which ordinary citizens position themselves within a con temporary landscape characterized by competing socialist and neoliberal orders. Under Mao, the state was often quite up front in its attempts to shape the opinions and beliefs of its citizens, and while these efforts have continued in the post-Mao era they often overlap with sociopo liti cal, cultural, and religious forces that have the potential to interpellate subjects in diff er ent ways.
The four chapters in part II-by Bryan Tilt, Kabzung and Emily T. Yeh, Biao Xiang, and Rachel Leng-examine diff er ent communities and demographic groups positioned at the outer borders of China's con temporary social order. From ethnic minorities in Southwest China's Sichuan Province to yakherding communities in Tibet, and from eco nom ically depressed communities in China's far northeast to queer subjects positioned at the symbolic margins of its major cities, these four case studies focus on groups that find themselves at the interstices of these conflicting developmental imperatives. Each of these analyses, however, contends that these overlapping configurations can potentially generate new possibilities for individual self-positioning and self-constitution, as these subjects may leverage diff er ent sociopo liti cal forces to create new positionalities.
Fi nally, we turn to China's sea of mi grant workers. The growing economic disparities between urban and rural areas have produced a set of power ful incentives drawing workers from the countryside to the cities. Overwhelming the Maoist-era hukou system, this wealth gap has generated a vast floating population of rural-to-urban mi grants. China's 2010 census found that more than 220 million people had spent at least six months of the preceding year living away from their hometowns, including approximately 130 to 160 million rural-to-urban mi grant workers. In fact, this floating population of mi grant workers is currently so large that if it were a nation unto itself, it would be the tenth most populous country in the world. It is, however, a population that lacks many of the rights and privileges enjoyed by official urban residents, and the result is a situation in which mi grant workers provide much of the cheap labor on which the nation's continued economic growth is predicated, even as many of them are condemned to a precarious existence and enjoy only limited benefits from the growth they helped make pos si ble in the first place (Lee 1998 (Lee , 2007 .
Rather than treat this floating population of mi grant workers as a strictly demographic phenomenon, however, we focus instead on how these workers are classified by the socioeconomic systems within which they are positioned and how they themselves appear to understand their own position within these same systems. Looking at workers in Italian-owned garment factories, at the school-aged children of mi grant workers, and at fictional mi grants caught up in complicated confidence schemes, the final three chapters in this volume-by Lisa Rofel, Ralph Litzinger, and Carlos Rojas-examine diff er ent populations of mi grants whose subjectivities are shaped by the overlapping sociopo liti cal structures within which they are embedded. In par tic u lar, each of these groups is driven by a set of aspirational dreams of what they hope to become, though often this optimism may well have a counterproductive-or, as Lauren Berlant (2011) calls it, a "cruel"-dimension, in that their dreams of the future may in fact directly undermine their ability to thrive in the pres ent.
Unlike socioeconomic pro cesses that are perceived as being rooted in either Marxist historical determinism or cap i tal ist imperatives, the protocols that we examine in this volume are often highly contingent and provisional. To the extent that these protocols derive out of the institutional and ideological fractures that open up between the ostensibly antithetical regimes of Maoism and neoliberalism, we contend that they are inflected both by a logic of global capitalism and by a set of institutional structures developed during the socialist period, while at the same time they have generated a set of conditions that invite a neo-Marxian critique. We are interested, in other words, in a body of protocols, haunted by the ghosts of capital, shades of Mao, and specters of Marx, that collectively suture China's future to its past and pres ent and also help to negotiate the nation's relationship with the rest of the world.
In the 2011 blockbuster film Mission Impossible-Ghost Protocol (directed by Brad Bird), the members of a special ops team are unexpectedly implicated in a mysterious terrorist bombing of the Kremlin. In response, the U.S. president activates a top secret policy referred to as "Ghost Protocol, " whereby the team is officially disbanded while simultaneously instructed to continue working in an unofficial capacity to track down those responsible for the bombing. The result is a delicate dance of deception and duplicity, in which the team is stripped of its legitimacy, authority, and even its very identity so that it may attempt to locate the covert enemy that had framed it.
Although Bird's film is obviously fantasy, it nevertheless resonates with contemporary concerns in suggestive ways. For instance, the covert team is called imf, which is short here for Impossible Missions Force but is, of course, also the acronym for the International Monetary Fund whose function, like Hunt's fictional team, is to diffuse existing crises and prevent new ones. Also, Bird's film revolves around a set of Cold War themes that include covert Rus sian agents, stolen missiles, and the threat of nuclear war. By resurrecting the former Soviet Union to serve as a worthy antagonist, the film tacitly acknowledges the continued relevance of the communist ideology that the USSR represented. Furthermore, the two years preceding the release of Ghost Protocol coincided with emerging concerns that Greece, one of Eu rope's most rapidly developing economies in the early 2000s, was having trou ble financing its growing debt. Despite repeated bailout attempts, Greece's economy has continued to spiral out of control, precipitating a financial crisis that threatens the very existence of the Eu ro pean Union itself. Hidden in the margins of Bird's film, accordingly, we find allusions to the International Monetary Fund, the former Soviet Union, and con temporary Eu rope's sovereign debt crisis, suggesting the degree to which the con temporary world remains haunted by the ghosts of capital, the shades of communism, and the specters of Marx.
The circumstances surrounding Eu rope's con temporary debt crisis mirror those of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in that, in both cases, a combination of debt and inflation threatened to destabilize an entire region's economy. If the Asian financial crisis was largely rooted in the fact that the currencies of the vari ous countries were too in de pen dent of one another (thereby permitting speculators to play one currency against the other), however, the Eu ropean sovereign debt was instead a product of the continent's decision to unify behind a single currency. While the imf's intervention in the Asian financial crisis was criticized as a form of financial imperialism, in the Eu ro pean instance we find an inverse situation, in that in June 2012 China announced that it was leading the so-called brics nations (Brazil, Rus sia, India, China, and South Africa) and about fifteen other developing nations in making new funding pledges to help the imf address Eu rope's debt crisis. In return the countries demanded greater repre sen ta tion and influence within the fund itself. In this way, China was attempting to capitalize on Eu rope's economic crisis in order to leverage a greater voice for itself within the imf, thereby figuratively colonizing the Europeancentered global monetary institution from within.
This mutual invagination of capitalism and its spectral Other, meanwhile, captures the analytical logic of our volume, which focuses on a set of ghostly protocols haunted by intersecting and conflicting ideological and programmatic imperatives. Just as the specific contours of post-Mao China's embrace of capitalism continue to be shaped by the country's vestigial socialist institutions and ideologies, those same socialist institutions are themselves inflected by the shadowy presence of capitalism and capital ( either in the form of a historical legacy, à la Marx, that communism was originally attempting to displace, or as an optimistic anticipation, à la Kojève, of the hyperbolic consumerism against which communism is theoretically opposed). 
